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Abstract
The design and evaluation of environmental policy requires the incorporation of time and
risk elements as many environmental outcomes extend over long time periods and involve a
large degree of uncertainty. Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate risks with
respect to environmental outcomes is a prime component in designing effective environmental
policy to address issues of environmental sustainability, such as climate change. Our objective
in this study is to investigate whether subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion across the
monetary domain and the environmental domain differ. Crucially, our experimental design
is incentivized: in the monetary domain, time preferences and risk aversion are elicited with
real monetary payoffs, whereas in the environmental domain, we elicit time preferences and
risk aversion using real (bee-friendly) plants. We find that subjects’ time preferences are not
significantly different across the monetary and environmental domains. In contrast, subjects’
risk aversion is significantly different across the two domains. More specifically, subjects (men
and women) exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain relative to
the monetary domain. Finally, we corroborate earlier results, which document that women are
more risk averse than men in the monetary domain. We show this finding to, also, hold in the
environmental domain.
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1 Introduction
The design and evaluation of environmental policy requires the incorporation of time and
risk elements as many environmental outcomes extend over long time periods and involve a
large degree of uncertainty. Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate risks with
respect to environmental outcomes is a prime component in designing effective environmental
policy to address issues of environmental sustainability, such as climate change. Our objec-
tive in this study is to investigate whether subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion across
the monetary domain and the environmental domain differ. By domain, we refer to the set
to which a particular measurement instrument belongs (i.e. choices over outcomes measured
in money belong to the monetary domain, whereas choices over outcomes measured in, say,
plants belong to the environmental domain).
We elicit subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion using a controlled ‘within-subject’
experimental design. First, to isolate the effect of domain on intertemporal choices, the fixed-
sequence choice titration (Harrison and Lau (2005); Read, Frederick, Orsel, and Rahman
(2005); Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m (2008); Hardisty and Weber (2009)) is used.
In this approach, subjects are presented with a series of binary intertemporal choices between
a fixed amount that is due at one point in time (henceforth, referred to as smaller sooner) and
a larger amount that is due at a later point in time (henceforth, referred to as larger later).
While the smaller sooner amount is kept fixed, the larger later amount increases successively.
In the beginning, subjects typically prefer the smaller sooner amount to the larger later
one. However, at some point, a switch takes place from the smaller sooner to the larger
later amount, which enables the experimenter to extract the discount-rate bracket within
which the individual’s rate of time preference lies. Second, to elicit subjects’ risk aversion,
a variant of the Eckel-Grossman test (Eckel and Grossman (2002); Eckel and Grossman
(2008)) is used, where subjects are presented with five gambles of varying riskiness and are
required to select the one they prefer. Crucially, in order to ensure that the magnitude of
the choices in the monetary domain matched those in the environmental domain, prior to
running the experimental sessions, we calibrated the value of the environmental instrument
using two contingent valuation studies. Finally, subjects were required to take the Cognitive
Reflection Test and to complete a questionnaire. The latter two tasks enabled us to obtain
both a measure of subjects’ cognitive ability to reflect and deliberate in the face of intuitively
simple alternatives as well as insights to subjects’ environmental attitudes, which could
possibly relate to the way different domains were evaluated.
A novelty of the experimental design is that it is incentivized: in the monetary domain,
time preferences and risk aversion are elicited with real monetary payoffs, whereas in the
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environmental domain, we elicit time preferences and risk aversion using real (bee-friendly)
plants.1 Our choice for the appropriate environmental instrument was not an easy one. The
instrument had to be familiar to subjects to facilitate their understanding of its potential
benefits, and credible so that subjects could rest assured that the project is one that can be
easily implemented without arousing suspicion of deception. Finally, the instrument had to
be divisible so as to enable us to vary the larger later amount and the gambles. The choice of
a locally-based project that distributed bee-friendly plants fulfilled all these requirements.2
Our first set of main results does not find any significant differences in subjects’ time pref-
erences across the monetary and environmental domains. Assuming away any philosophical
or ethical issues that might dictate what the discount rate ought to be in environmental
cost-benefit analysis, a corollary of the first result is that the same discount rate used for
financial payoffs should also be used for the environmental ones when evaluating environ-
mental policies. This corollary is reassuring to economists and policy makers who, for some
time now, have been evaluating environmental policies with discount rates that are based on
the intertemporal-choice framework of the monetary domain.
Our second set of main results finds domain differences in subjects’ risk aversion. More
specifically, subjects (men and women) exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the en-
vironmental domain relative to the monetary domain; that is, individuals tend to be more
reluctant to take on large gambles with environmental outcomes than with monetary ones.
A plausible explanation for the emergence of domain differences in risk aversion could be
stemming from individuals’ perception on the consequences of climate changes − a topic that
has been well publicized. Furthermore, we corroborate existing results, which document that
women are more risk averse than men in the monetary domain. We show this finding to,
also, hold in the environmental domain. The latter findings seem to hint that women are
more risk averse than men independently of the domain, although more research is necessary
to validate such conjecture.
Our third set of results does not find any support of the hypothesis that time prefer-
ences/risk aversion are correlated with subjects’ cognitive abilities or environmental aware-
ness. However, when we partition the discounting behavior of subjects into three categories
based on whether they discounted the environmental domain the same as, more than, or
less than the monetary domain, we find significant correlation between subjects exhibiting
environmental awareness and lower discounting in the environmental domain.
1There exists evidence to suggest that incentivized experiments may have an impact on the discount rates
elicited (Coller and Williams (1999); Kirby and Marakovi (1995)).
2To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use a real environmental instrument; the only
other study that we are aware of that investigates differences in time preferences across the monetary and
the environmental domains used hypothetical environmental payoffs (Hardisty and Weber (2009)).
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The paper adheres to the following plan. We present next an overview of the related
literature. Section 3 describes, in relative detail, the experimental design. Section 4 presents
the data analysis, and Section 5 discusses the important findings and provides direction for
future research.
2 Literature Review
Our paper is related to two main strands of the literature on decision-making across domains.
First, it is related to the growing literature on domain differences in time preferences. The
impact of domains on intertemporal choice has predominantly revolved around the monetary
domain and the health domain, where most studies find differences in subjects’ discounting
behavior.3 Recently, in the midst of a public debate on the appropriate discount rate to
evaluate the consequences of climate change (Stern (2007); Nordhaus (2007)),4 the investi-
gation on the impact of domains on intertemporal choice has expanded to, also, include the
environmental domain. In their study, Hardisty and Weber (2009) compared intertemporal
choices elicited in the three aforementioned domains and found that subjects’ discounting
behavior was not statistically different across the environmental and monetary domains, but
was statistically different across the health domain and the other two domains. Hardisty
and Weber (2009) attributed the domain effect in health to subjects’ visceral reaction to the
health scenarios. Other studies have also assessed the discounting behavior of subjects in
the environmental domain albeit via risk assessments. Bo¨hm and Pfister (2005), for exam-
ple, conducted experiments to measure subjects’ risk assessment of hypothetical scenarios
on coastal erosion and marine oil spills. The authors found that temporal discounting of
environmental risks was weak and postulated that ethical evaluations were not discounted
by subjects. Along the same lines, Gattig and Hendrickx (2007) concluded that temporal
discounting was less pronounced for environmental risks than for risks in other domains.
Finally, Viscusi, Huber, and Bell (2008) estimated discounting rates based on a series of
environmental policy choices administered in a survey context. A key finding of their study
was that discounting behavior differs markedly for people who visit lakes, rivers, and streams
for recreational purposes and those who do not. More specifically, regular visitors to water
3Many studies find that discount rates in the health domain are larger than those in the monetary domain
for health gains, but lower than those in the monetary domain for health losses (Cairns (1992); Chapman
and Elstein (1995); Madden, Bickel, and Jacobs (1999)).
4As Weitzman (2007) aptly notes, “it is not an exaggeration to say that the biggest uncertainty of all
in the economics of climate change is the uncertainty about which interest rate to use for discounting” (p.
705).
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bodies have low discounting rates, whereas those who do not visit water bodies often have
consistently high discounting rates.
Our work is also related to the literature on risk preferences across domains. Dohmen,
Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011) used a large, representative survey of the
German population to elicit risk preferences across a number of domains and found that the
self-reported risk-taking measures are highly, but not perfectly, correlated across domains.5
In a study with a different flavor, Riddel (2012) compared subjects’ evaluation of financial
and environmental lotteries to determine whether preferences over environmental risks can
be reasonably approximated by the Expected Utility framework. The author found that
subjects were more likely to overemphasise low probability, extreme environmental outcomes
than low probability, extreme financial ones. As a result, she concluded that the Expected
Utility framework is likely to underestimate subjects’ willingness to pay for environmental
cleanup programs or policies with uncertain outcomes. Much earlier, Weber, Blais, and Betz
(2002) argued that individuals are not characterized by a single risk attitude, but rather
exhibit different risk preferences depending on the domain.
All the aforementioned studies pertaining the environmental domain used an elicitation
method based on hypothetical environmental gains and losses. In sharp contrast, our study
uses an incentivized scheme with real monetary and environmental payoffs. The use of real
payoffs creates a strong incentive for subjects to display their true preferences and increases
the attention given to the task at hand. There is evidence that the use of real payoffs
might matter in discounting experiments. For instance, Kirby and Marakovi (1995) found
that discount rates elicited for real monetary payoffs were higher than those elicited for
hypothetical ones. Testing a similar setting, Coller and Williams (1999) were less conclusive
in their findings, while Camerer and Hogarth (1999), in a wide survey on the role of real
incentives, found no effect on mean performance albeit found a reduction in variance with
high financial incentives. The authors noted that high incentives improved performance in
demanding tasks and reduced generosity and risk-seeking behavior. The effect of incentives
is, also, confirmed in other studies investigating the impact of real payoffs in experiments
(Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport (1988); Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstro¨m (1995)).
5Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011) tested the following domains: career choices,
leisure and recreational activities, financial decisions, health, and driving. They used a scale from 1 to 10,
with 10 signifying the greatest willingness to take risks.
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3 Experimental Design
Our experimental setup featured six tasks. Two of these tasks aimed to investigate subjects’
intertemporal choices across the monetary domain and the environmental domain. The two
tasks differed solely on the instrument that was discounted; that is, the valuation of the
two instruments was identical (see Subsection 3.2). In the monetary domain, the instrument
that was discounted was money, whereas in the environmental domain the instrument that
was discounted was plants. To isolate the effect of domain on intertemporal choices, we used
the fixed-sequence choice titration (Harrison and Lau (2005); Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and
Rutstro¨m (2008); Hardisty and Weber (2009)).6 In this approach, subjects are presented
with a series of binary choices between a fixed amount that is due at one point in time
and a larger amount that is due at a later point in time. While the smaller sooner amount
is kept fixed, the larger later amount increases successively. The experimental data on
the repeated binary intertemporal choices are transformed into a single switching point; the
latter produces a discount-rate interval, which contains the indifference point of each subject.
Another two tasks aimed to measure the risk aversion of subjects across the monetary domain
and the environmental domain. The tests on risk aversion were based on the Eckel-Grossman
test (Eckel and Grossman (2002); Eckel and Grossman (2008)) and differed, only, on the
measurement instrument. Analogous to the previous setup, in the monetary domain, the
test used monetary gambles, whereas in the environmental domain, the test used gambles
in plants. In addition to the four aforementioned tasks, subjects were required to take the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and to complete a questionnaire. On one hand, the CRT
allowed us to obtain a measure of subjects’ cognitive ability to reflect and deliberate in the
face of intuitively simple alternatives. On the other hand, the questionnaire allowed us to
elicit subjects’ environmental attitudes.7 In summary, the addition of the latter two tasks
served to provide insights into possible individual heterogeneity that could be related to the
way different domains were evaluated by subjects.
6Other studies (Raineri and Rachlin (1993); Green, Fry, and Myerson (1994)) have used the staircase
choice titration method. The latter method presents subjects with an initial binary intertemporal choice
and dynamically adapts the subsequent choices depending on the subject’s decisions. Finally, a third method
is the matching-tasks method (Kirby and Marakovi (1995); Chapman (1996); Cairns and van der Pol (1999)),
where subjects are asked to indicate what amount they would require in order to postpone the receipt of
a given outcome by a given time delay. In essence, this method asks subjects to reveal directly the upper
bracket of their indifference point. However, Hardisty, Thompson, Krantz, and Weber (2013) note that
choice-based measures, such as the fixed-sequence choice titration and the staircase choice titration, are
better predictors of real world outcomes than matching tasks. Additionally, the authors point out that the
demanding dynamic staircase titration offers no advantages over the simpler fixed-sequence choice titration,
making the latter the most appropriate method for this experiment.
7The questions were taken from the Segmentation Model created by the Department for Environment,
Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA (2008)).
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Our experimental design applied a hybrid of a ‘within-subject’ and ‘between-subject’
design (Charness, Gneezy, and Kuhn (2012)). In line with a standard ‘within-subject’ design,
each subject was exposed sequentially to the six tasks. We safeguarded against the possibility
of observing order effects by splitting the sample into four subsamples (A1, A2, B1 and B2).
The four subsamples differed only in the order the first four tasks were presented (i.e. the
monetary discounting task, the monetary risk aversion test, the environmental discounting
task, and the environmental risk aversion test), thereby replicating a ‘between-design’ for
these four tasks. This allowed us to harness the strength of each design while safeguarding
against possible confounds. The experimental design is indicated in Table 1. In Panel A,
we provide a brief description of the task and the corresponding acronym. In Panel B, we
display the order of the tasks in the four subsamples.
Table 1: Experimental Design
Panel A
Task Acronym
Monetary Discounting MD
Monetary Risk Aversion Test MRAT
Environmental Discounting ED
Environmental Risk Aversion Test ERAT
Cognitive Reflection Test CRT
Questionnaire Q
Panel B
Subsamples
Stage A1 A2 B1 B2
1 MD MRAT ED ERAT
2 MRAT MD ERAT ED
3 ED ERAT MD MRAT
4 ERAT ED MRAT MD
5 CRT CRT CRT CRT
6 Q Q Q Q
# of Subjects 31 31 27 29
# of Sessions 2 2 2 2
Notes: In Panel A, we provide a brief description of the task and the corresponding acronym. In Panel B, we
display the order of the tasks in the four subsamples. The last 2 tasks were common in all four subsamples.
The first four tasks (MD, MRAT, ED and ERAT) were shuﬄed across the four subsamples. The last two
rows, display the total number of participants and the number of sessions in each subsample.
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3.1 Environmental Instrument
Our choice for the appropriate environmental instrument was not an easy one. First, we
required that the instrument is divisible so as to enable us to vary the larger later amount
and the gambles. Second, the instrument had to be familiar to subjects and credible. It
had to be familiar to subjects to facilitate their understanding of its potential benefits as
well as credible so that subjects could rest assured that the project is one that can be easily
implemented without arousing suspicion of deception. The choice of a locally-based project
that distributed bee-friendly plants fulfilled all these requirements. Subjects were instructed
that bee-friendly plants would be handed out to staff and students on campus to be placed
in outdoor areas. Given the different delay periods, different bee-friendly plants were chosen.
Subjects were informed that the plants distributed would be chosen depending on the season
to ensure that they are immediately beneficial.
The environmental project was described in a succinct and neutral manner. The link
between bee-friendly plants and the positive externality they generate was stated in the
description as well as the fact that bee populations are in decline. These two facts are
central to the placing of the project as an environmentally beneficial one. Given that these
plants would be distributed to staff and students on campus, this meant that the plants
would not accrue to themselves but to the wider community. The external benefits would,
of course, be felt by the entire community to a smaller extent. A total of 63 plants were
distributed from the University Transport Interchange as a result of this experiment. The
full description of the project is reported in the Appendix.
3.2 Valuation of a Bee-Friendly Plant
In order to ensure that the magnitude of the choices in the monetary domain matched that
of the choices in the environmental domain, prior to the experimental sessions, we calibrated
the value of a bee-friendly plant using two contingent valuation studies carried out at the
University of Southampton.8 Subjects participating in the studies were given the same
project description that was used in the experimental sessions.
Each study consisted of 81 students of the University of Southampton. The first contin-
gent valuation study presented subjects with an open-ended question asking them to indicate
their maximum willingness to pay to contribute one extra plant to the project. The purpose
of this study was to allow for the calibration of the values to be used in the second study.
8It is well documented in the literature on discounting that small payoffs are discounted more heavily than
larger ones. This regularity is referred to as the magnitude effect (Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue
(2002)). Our approach minimizes this effect.
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The median value of subjects’ responses was £5. The top five modal values were utilized
in the second contingent valuation study, which presented subjects with only one out of the
five possible values. Subjects were asked whether they were willing to pay that particular
amount to contribute one extra bee-friendly plant to the project. The sample was split
between the five values, with 17 subjects responding to the first value of £0.50, 15 subjects
responding to the second value of £2.50, 17 subjects responding to the third value of £5.00,
16 subjects responding to the fourth value of £10.00, and 16 subjects responding to the
final value of £15.00. The different values presented to respondents and the corresponding
acceptance percentages are displayed in Table 2. We found that the mean willingness to pay
was approximately £4.98.9 This specific value was close enough to the median response in
the open-ended question of the first study. Consequently, we rounded the number to the
nearest pound, and implemented a conversion rate of 1 plant = £5. Subjects were there-
fore presented with choices starting at £50 in the monetary domain and 10 plants in the
environmental domain. The plants that were distributed were purchased for £3 to £5 each.
Table 2: Valuation of a Bee-Friendly Plant
Value Presented Acceptance Rate
£0.50 88 %
£2.50 60 %
£5.00 41 %
£10.00 19 %
£15.00 6 %
Notes: In the first column, the monetary values that were presented to respondents in the second contingent
valuation study are displayed. Subjects were presented with only one out of the five possible values. Subjects
were asked whether they were willing to pay that particular amount to contribute one extra plant to the
project. The sample consisted of 81 subjects who were split between the five values. In the second column,
we display the corresponding acceptance percentages; that is, the percentage of subjects who replied that
they would be willing to pay that value to contribute one extra plant to the project.
3.3 Tasks
All experimental sessions consisted of six stages with one task in each stage. Subjects
were informed of the total number of stages at the start of the experimental session, but
9The mean willingness to pay was estimated using a probit model with the binary response (‘yes’ or ‘no’
to the willingness to pay question) as the dependent variable and the monetary value displayed to the subject
as the only explanatory variable along with a constant term.
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were introduced to the tasks of the stages as they progressed through the session. The
experimental sessions were conducted in the Social Sciences Experimental Lab (SSEL) at the
University of Southampton in March and April of 2014. The subjects were recruited from
the student population of the University of Southampton using an electronic recruitment
system. Subjects were allowed to participate in only one session. A total of 118 students
participated in the experiment. The split across gender was almost even: 54% were men
and 46% were women. The ages ranged from 18 to 28. The average age was 20 years
old. Most subjects (around 60%) were pursuing an economics degree. Students pursuing
a mathematics degree (around 12%) had also a large representation in the sample, as well
as students pursuing a philosophy degree (around 4%). The remaining 24% of the sample
were students studying to earn a degree in one of english, history, modern languages, music,
chemistry, law, health sciences and geography. 93% of the subjects were undergraduates;
the rest pursued postgraduate studies. Each session had at most 16 subjects (this is the
maximum capacity of the lab) and lasted approximately 45 minutes. The minimum number
of subjects in a session was 13. The total number of subjects in each subsample and the
total number of sessions in each subsample are displayed in the last two rows in Panel B of
Table 1. Each participant received £5 as a participation fee. The experimental codes were
programmed using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). The experimental
instructions are provided in the Appendix.
3.3.1 Monetary Discounting (MD) & Environmental Discounting (ED)
The Monetary Discounting (MD) task presented subjects with choices between a smaller
sooner amount and a larger later amount. The smaller sooner amount was kept fixed at
£50, whereas the larger later amount started at £55 and progressively increased to £100
(i.e. £60, £65, £70, £75, £100). Subjects were presented with these six choices for three
different delay periods: (i) a 3-month delay period, (ii) a 6-month delay period, and (iii) a
12-month delay period. Thus, in total subjects had to respond to 6× 3 = 18 questions. The
implied hyperbolic discount-rate brackets in each of the delay periods became progressively
smaller. Note that the implied discount-rate brackets were not provided to subjects. In
total, we extracted three monetary discount brackets for each subject.10 The binary choices
and the implied hyperbolic discount-rate brackets are displayed in Panel A of Table 3. To
calculate the implied discount rates, we used the hyperbolic formula ρ = 12(F/P − 1)/T ,
where ρ is the discount rate, F is the future value, P is the present value and T is the time
10A little less than 92% of subjects had one switching point. Subjects who switched more than once were
excluded from the analysis (see Subsection 4.1.1).
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delay (in months) between the present and the future value (Doyle (2013)).11
Table 3: Binary Choices and Implied Discount-Rate Brackets
Panel A
Monetary Discounting (MD)
Binary Choice Hyperbolic Discount-Rate Brackets
Smaller sooner Larger later 3-month 6-month 12-month
(£) (£) (%) (%) (%)
50 55 /− 40 /− 20 /− 10
50 60 40− 80 20− 40 10− 20
50 65 80− 120 40− 60 20− 30
50 70 120− 160 60− 80 30− 40
50 75 160− 200 80− 100 40− 50
50 100 200− 400 100− 200 50− 100
Panel B
Environmental Discounting (ED)
Binary Choice Hyperbolic Discount-Rate Brackets
Smaller sooner Larger later 3-month 6-month 12-month
(plants) (plants) (%) (%) (%)
10 11 /− 40 /− 20 /− 10
10 12 40− 80 20− 40 10− 20
10 13 80− 120 40− 60 20− 30
10 14 120− 160 60− 80 30− 40
10 15 160− 200 80− 100 40− 50
10 20 200− 400 100− 200 50− 100
Notes: In Panel A, we display the binary choices and the implied hyperbolic discount-rate brackets in the
Monetary Discounting (MD) task. In Panel B, we display the binary choices and the implied hyperbolic
discount-rate brackets in the Environmental Discounting (ED) task.
All the intertemporal choices presented to participants incorporated a front-end delay
as is standard practice in many such experimental studies. Rather than giving subjects an
earlier option that is payable at the end of the experimental session, discounting experiments,
typically, make use of a front-end delay where the smaller sooner choice is itself delayed by
a short time period (Coller and Williams (1999); Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstro¨m
(2008)). The main advantage of this approach is that the front-end delay safeguards against
possible confounding effects caused by any perceived transaction costs being associated with
11Here, our objective is to investigate subjects’ intertemporal choices across the monetary domain and the
environmental domain. We remain agnostic as to the actual numerical value of the discount rate. Calculating
the actual discount rate is outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, our qualitative results are robust to
consistent changes in the functional form across the two domains.
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the larger later payment (Harrison and Lau (2005)).
The payment method was designed to further reduce any perceived transaction costs.
Subjects were given a requisition form at the end of the experimental session, which detailed
their payoffs. The requisition form had to be dropped off at the Finance Office (in the School
of Social Sciences at the University of Southampton) and participants were paid by direct
debit by the Finance Office on the date specified on the form. The precise process was
explained in the experimental instructions.
In the Environmental Discounting (ED) task, subjects were presented with the same
setup as in the MD task; that is, six binary choices were displayed for each of the (three)
different delay periods. Analogous to the task above, three environmental discount brackets
were obtained for each subject. The only difference between this task and the previous one
is that subjects were presented with the environmental instrument (i.e. plants) instead of
money. The binary choices presented to subjects and the implied hyperbolic discount-rate
brackets are displayed in Panel B of Table 3.
3.3.2 Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT) & Environmental Risk Aversion
Test (ERAT)
The two tests served to elicit subjects’ risk aversion in the monetary domain and the en-
vironmental domain. We used a variant of the Eckel-Grossman test (Eckel and Grossman
(2002); Eckel and Grossman (2008)), where subjects were presented with five gambles of
varying riskiness and were required to select the one they prefer. All gambles had two possi-
ble outcomes: Outcome X with 50% likelihood and Outcome Y with 50% likelihood; that is,
both outcomes were equiprobable. In addition, the expected payoffs were easy to calculate
and the increasing variance as the gambles got riskier was significantly large to be noticeable.
This test is a simplified version of the one designed by Holt and Laury (2002), albeit still
elicits sufficient heterogeneity in subjects’ responses (Eckel and Grossman (2008)).
The Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT) was set at a magnitude level that was com-
parable to the choices given to subjects in the discounting tasks. The gambles started at
an option with identical outcomes (i.e. a gain of £50) and moved to options of increasing
variance at the point where the last option’s equiprobable outcomes were £5 and £162.50.
Expected payoffs increased as you moved down the table, so choices further down indicated
lower risk aversion. The Environmental Risk Aversion Test (ERAT) was matched in magni-
tude to the MRAT at the same conversion rate of money per plant (£5 per plant) used in the
discounting tasks. Analogous to the MRAT, the first option had identical outcomes, whereas
the last option’s equiprobable outcomes were 1 plant and 33 plants. The lists of gambles
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Table 4: Risk Aversion Tests
Panel A
Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT)
Option Outcome Payoffs Probability
(£)
1 X 50.00 50%
Y 50.00 50%
2 X 35.00 50%
Y 87.50 50%
3 X 25.00 50%
Y 112.50 50%
4 X 15.00 50%
Y 137.50 50%
5 X 5.00 50%
Y 162.50 50%
Panel B
Environmental Risk Aversion Test (ERAT)
Option Outcome Payoffs Probability
(plants)
1 X 10 plants 50%
Y 10 plants 50%
2 X 7 plants 50%
Y 18 plants 50%
3 X 5 plants 50%
Y 23 plants 50%
4 X 3 plants 50%
Y 28 plants 50%
5 X 1 plant 50%
Y 33 plants 50%
Notes: Panel A displays the Monetary Risk Aversion Test (MRAT). Panel B displays the Environmental Risk
Aversion Test (ERAT). Both panels follow the same structure. In the first column, the 5 options available
to subjects are listed. In the second column, the possible outcomes of each option are listed: Outcome X or
Outcome Y. In the third column, the payoffs associated with each outcome in each option are listed. Note
that the inability to express decimals in plants led us to the rounding up of payoffs in this domain. In column
four, the probability of that specific outcome occurring is listed.
presented in the MRAT and the ERAT are displayed in Panel A and Panel B, respectively,
in Table 4.
12
3.3.3 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) & Questionnaire (Q)
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) was proposed by Frederick (2005) as a way of measuring
a specific type of cognitive ability − that of suppressing a spontaneous response in favor of a
more deliberately-thought-out one. The CRT consists of 3 questions. In order to successfully
complete the CRT subjects were required to question their initial response and devote some
cognitive power to realize that it was incorrect and, consequently, arrive at the correct
answer. The inclusion of the CRT task allows us to capture the heterogeneity in subjects’
reflective ability. More specifically, cognitive ability could plausibly be increasingly relevant
to the evaluation of intertemporal (monetary and environmental) choices and (monetary and
environmental) risk aversion. The three CRT questions are included in the Appendix.
Finally, in the last stage, we administered the Questionnaire (Q). The questionnaire
consisted of questions of socio-demographic nature as well as 17 questions taken from the
Segmentation Model developed by DEFRA (2008).12 The latter part pertained to subjects’
values, attitudes and motivations as well as current behaviors and barriers to change. In
addition, the questions covered topics, such as climate change, recycling, transportation and
water use. The Q was administered in the last stage in order to remove any unintentional
impact these questions might have on the environmental intertemporal choices and environ-
mental risk aversion of subjects.
3.4 Payment Mechanism
The experimental design applied a variant of the random-lottery incentive scheme, where
subjects make a number of decisions knowing that, at the end of the experimental session,
one of these decisions will be selected for payment. There is a vast literature testing the va-
lidity of this payment scheme. Laury (2012) found that subjects do not scale down decisions
when they are only being paid for a subset of these decisions. Along the same lines, Cubitt,
Starmer, and Sugden (1998) confirmed that such design does not contaminate elicited prefer-
ences. Hey and Lee (2005) showed that subjects separate the various questions, and respond
to each question individually and in isolation from the rest; thus, incentives are retained. A
12The model segments the population into seven behavioral groups using a number of questions on envi-
ronmental attitudes and the respondents’ age. DEFRA has developed this model in order to further advance
behavioral change through social marketing strategies that target specific segments of the population. Their
objective is to achieve a more environmentally-friendly lifestyle for the public. Segmentation models are a
popular way of investigating the behavior of individuals as it pertains to specific functions of their everyday
life, such as transportation choices and water consumption. The advantage of the DEFRA model is that it
targets attitudes towards many different environmental sectors, thus achieving a classification that captures
an individual’s overall attitude to issues of an environmental nature (Jesson (2009); Barr, Shaw, and Coles
(2011)).
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value-added of this approach is that it neutralizes the income effect that would otherwise be
experienced as subjects progress through the periods. Our approach was to apply a double
layered random-lottery incentive payment scheme. More specifically, two subjects in each
experimental session were randomly selected to be paid for their choices. The first subject
selected was paid for either the choice made in the MD task or the choice made in the ED
task, where each task had an equal probability of being selected. Once the domain was
selected, one of the 18 questions was drawn and the subject’s choice in that question was
paid (with money or plants accordingly). The second subject selected was paid for either
the choice made in the MRAT or the choice made in the ERAT, where each test had an
equal probability of being selected. Once the test was selected, an outcome was drawn (X
or Y where each outcome had an equal probability of being selected) and the subject was
paid (with money or plants accordingly) based on the gamble chosen.
The random selection was carried out using a bingo machine that was prominently dis-
played in the lab. Bingo balls were placed on subjects’ desks with the terminal ID number
on the ball. Subjects placed the balls into the bingo machine themselves at the end of the
experimental session and witnessed the random selection. This was necessary to ensure com-
plete transparency of the process. However, the choices of the subjects selected were not
revealed to the other subjects as that would violate the confidentiality with respect to their
earnings.
3.5 General Hypotheses
Our objective in this study is to investigate subjects’ intertemporal choices and risk aversion
across the monetary domain and the environmental domain. Based on the existing literature
(Hardisty and Weber (2009)), we hypothesized that the domain has no impact on subjects’
intertemporal choices − referred to as domain independence (Chapman (2003)). This hy-
pothesis is tested by comparing the intertemporal choices taken in the monetary domain with
those taken in the environmental domain. The first general hypothesis is thus formulated as
follows.
H1 (Domain Independence in Time Preferences): Subjects’ discounting behavior is the same
across the monetary and the environmental domains.
In an analogous manner, we hypothesized that subjects’ risk aversion is independent of
the domain. The second hypothesis is stated as follows.
H2 (Domain Independence in Risk Aversion): Subjects’ risk aversion is the same across the
monetary and the environmental domains.
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4 Results
The six hypotheses on the effect of domain are formally tested next. Each hypothesis is
matched with the corresponding result; that is, result i is a report on the test of hypothesis
i.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
4.1.1 Time Preferences
Recall that subjects had to decide on the switching point in the 3-month delay period, the 6-
month delay period, the 12-month delay period for both the monetary and the environmental
domains. Subjects that switched twice within the same time-delay period were taken out of
the data analysis. Thus, 10 subjects were excluded from the sample leaving us with a total
of 108 observations.
We present next the switching distribution of subjects in the three delay periods in
the monetary domain and in the three delay periods in the environmental domain. This
information is displayed in Figure 1. An individual with a binary choice of 1 in the monetary
domain, chose the larger later amount of £55 in lieu of the earlier smaller amount of £50,
and an individual with a binary choice of 1 in the environmental domain, chose the larger
later amount of 11 plants in lieu of the earlier smaller amount of 10 plants. An individual
with a binary choice of 7 in either the monetary or the environmental domain, always chose
the earlier smaller amount. The mean switch in the 3-month delay period (MD 3.8/ED 4.0)
implies an annual discount-rate bracket between 80% and 160%. The mean switch in the
6-month delay period (MD 5.1/ED 5.3) implies an average discount-rate bracket between
80% and 200%. Finally, the mean switch in the 12-month delay period (MD 5.5/ED 5.7)
implies an average discount-rate bracket between 40% and 100%.
We next allocate subjects into three categories based on their discounting behavior in the
monetary domain and the environmental domain while controlling for the time delay. More
specifically, we provide the frequency and percentage of subjects that exhibited one of the
three discounting patterns: (i) constant discounting across domains, (ii) higher discounting
in the environmental domain, and (iii) lower discounting in the environmental domain. The
findings are displayed in Table 5. Over the three time-delay periods, on average, the number
of subjects that exhibited a constant discounting behavior across the two domains was 30%,
40% of the subjects exhibited a higher discount rate in the environmental domain, and 30%
of the subjects exhibited a lower discount rate in the environmental domain.
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Figure 1: Switching Distribution
Notes: We display, on the left, the relative frequency of subjects’ switching distributions across the discount-
ing tasks in the monetary domain, and we display, on the right, the relative frequency of subjects’ switching
distributions across the discounting tasks in the environmental domain. An individual with a binary choice
of 1 in the monetary domain, chose the larger later amount of £55 in lieu of the earlier smaller amount of
£50, and an individual with a binary choice of 1 in the environmental domain, chose the larger later amount
of 11 plants in lieu of the earlier smaller amount of 10 plants. An individual with a binary choice of 7 in
either the monetary or the environmental domain, always chose the earlier smaller amount.
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Table 5: Discounting Patterns Across Domains
Time Delay: 3-month 6-month 12-month
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Constant discounting across domains 27 25 29 27 42 39
Higher environmental discounting 46 43 48 44 35 32
Lower environmental discounting 35 32 31 29 31 29
Total 108 108 108
Notes: We display information on subjects’ discounting behavior in the monetary domain and the environ-
mental domain while controlling for the time delay.
4.1.2 Risk Aversion
In the tests on risk aversion, subjects were given five gambles to choose from, where each
gamble featured two possible outcomes: Outcome X with 50% likelihood and Outcome
Y with 50% likelihood. The gambles started at a non-degenerate gamble and moved to
degenerate gambles of increasing variance and expected payoffs. In the Monetary Risk
Aversion Test (MRAT), 18% of subjects chose the non-degenerate gamble, 59% of subjects
chose one of the next two gambles, while the remaining 23% chose one of the last two gambles.
In the Environmental Risk Aversion Test (ERAT), 28% of subjects chose the non-degenerate
gamble, 54% of subjects chose one of the next two gambles, and the remaining 18% chose
one of the last two gambles. The relative frequency of subjects’ gambles across the MRAT
and ERAT is displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Distribution of Risk Aversion
Notes: We display, on the left, the relative frequency of subjects’ gambles across the MRAT, and we display,
on the right, the relative frequency of subjects’ gambles across the ERAT. Binary choices indicate the gambles
chosen by the subjects.
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4.1.3 Cognitive Reflection Test & Questionnaire
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) aims to measure subjects’ reflective ability. The test
requires subjects to answer three questions, where each question has 4 possible answers. The
CRT score consists of one positive point for every correct answer given. The score therefore
ranges from 0 to 3. 34% of the subjects answered all three questions correctly, while 18% of
subjects got all three questions wrong. The spread of scores suggests a dispersion of reflective
ability amongst subjects. The distribution for the CRT is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Distribution of CRT Scores
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Notes: We report the relative frequency of subjects’ CRT scores. The CRT score consists of one positive
point for every correct answer given.
The questionnaire consisted of questions of socio-demographic nature as well as 17 ques-
tions taken from the Segmentation Model developed by DEFRA (2008). The questions from
the Segmentation Model are provided in Panel A of Table 6. The model segments the re-
spondents into 7 behavioral groups. The frequencies and corresponding percentages of the
seven groups are displayed in Panel B of Table 6. The first four groups are considered pro-
environmental. In our sample, almost 78% of the respondents belong to one of the top four
pro-environmental groups. We further classify subjects that belong to the top four groups
as exhibiting environmental awareness.
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Table 6: Segmentation Model
Panel A
Questions
I would only travel by bus if I had no other choice.
For the sake of the environment, car users should pay higher taxes.
People who fly should bear the cost of the environmental damage that air travel causes.
I don’t pay much attention to the amount of water I use.
People have a duty to recycle.
We are close to the limit of the number of people that earth can support.
The earth has very limited room and resources.
If things continue on their current course, we will soon experience a major environmental disaster.
The so-called ‘environmental crisis’ facing humanity has been greatly exaggerated.
It would embarrass me if my friends thought my lifestyle was purposefully environmentally friendly.
Being green is an alternative lifestyle, it’s not for the majority.
I find it hard to change my habits to be more environmentally friendly.
It’s only worth doing environmentally-friendly things if they save you money.
The effects of climate change are too far in the future to really worry me.
It’s not worth me doing things to help the environment if others don’t do the same.
It’s not worth Britain trying to combat climate change, other countries will just cancel what we do.
Which of these best describes how you feel about your current lifestyle and the environment?
Panel B
Groups Freq. %
Positive Greens 34 31.5
Waste Watchers 5 4.6
Concerned Consumers 29 27.0
Sideline Supporters 16 14.8
Cautious Participants 10 9.3
Stalled Starters 5 4.6
Honestly Disengaged 9 8.3
Notes: Panel A displays the questions that constitute the Segmentation Model, and Panel B classifies the
108 respondents into 7 behavioral groups (DEFRA (2008)). With the exception of the last question, the
possible responses to all other statements were: ‘Strongly agree,’ ‘Tend to agree,’ ‘Neither agree nor disagree,’
‘Strongly disagree,’ and ‘Don’t know.’ In the last question, the possible responses were: ‘I’d like to do a lot
more to help the environment,’ ‘I’d like to do a bit more to help the environment,’ ‘I’m happy with what I
do at the moment,’ and ‘Don’t know.’
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4.2 Order Effects
The principal drawback of a ‘within-subject’ experimental design is the possibility that the
order in which the subjects are presented with the tasks might influence their choices. Recall
that in our setup, we allowed for four subsamples (see Table 1). In Table 7, we test for
differences in subjects’ choices across the four subsamples. More specifically, we use pairwise
χ2-tests, where the H0 states that subjects’ choice in a specific task across subsamples is not
statistically different. Thus, rejecting the null would imply that the setup is confounded with
order effects. With the exception of the 3-month delay in the environmental discounting task,
our design does not seem to be susceptible to order effects. However, given the possibility of
an order bias, we imposed a consistency check to our data analysis. Specifically, the same
analysis was carried out using a much restricted dataset that consisted of data from only
the first task of the subsamples. The two main results reported in the next two subsections
withstand the consistency check imposed.
Table 7: Order Effects
Alternative hypothesis: choicei 6= choicej
p-values
Time Preferences
MD (3-month delay) 0.409
MD (6-month delay) 0.456
MD (12-month delay) 0.628
ED (3-month delay) 0.007
ED (6-month delay) 0.560
ED (12-month delay) 0.276
Risk Aversion
MRAT 0.158
ERAT 0.152
Notes: We utilize the χ2-test to determine whether subjects’ choice in a specific task differs (i 6= j) across
subsamples.
4.3 Domain Differences in Time Preferences & Risk Aversion
The first hypothesis aims to determine whether a change in domain has an effect on subjects’
discounting behavior. We formally test our hypothesis using a standard χ2-test, where the
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H0 states that the discounting behavor across the monetary and the environmental domains
is similar when controlling for the time delay. The results are displayed in Table 8. Similar
to the findings of Hardisty and Weber (2009), we find that we cannot reject the H0. This
finding is formalized next in our first main result.13
RESULT 1: Subjects’ discounting behavior is the same across the monetary and the envi-
ronmental domains.
Support. The χ2-test conducted does not find any significant differences in discounting
across the monetary domain and the environmental domain.
Table 8: χ2-Tests on Domain Differences in Time Preferences
Alternative hypothesis: MD 6= ED
p-values
3-Month 0.192
6-Month 0.256
12-Month 0.328
Notes: We report p-values from the χ2-test, where the H0 states that the discounting behavior across the
monetary and the environmental domains is similar when controlling for the time delay.
The second hypothesis aims to determine whether a change in domain has an impact
on subjects’ risk aversion. Analogous to the analysis in the previous subsection, we, also,
run a standard χ2-test to examine whether subjects’ choices on gambles are the same across
domains. Table 9 shows the result of the test. The H0 is rejected at the 1% level of statistical
significance; that is, there exists serious evidence of a domain effect in subjects’ choices on
gambles.
We, also, run two ordered probit regressions in Table 10 with subjects’ choices in the tests
on risk aversion as the categorical dependent variable. Domain is an explanatory dummy
regression variable, which takes the value of 1 if the risk aversion has been obtained from
the ERAT and 0 if the risk aversion has been obtained from the MRAT. We investigate two
13Recall that the experimental data on the repeated binary intertemporal choices are transformed into a
single switching point; the latter produces a discount-rate interval, which contains the indifference point of
each subject. Given that the data is of an interval nature and this feature is not captured by the above
test, we, also, run an interval regression, which allows for the specification of the (discount-rate) brackets
presented to participants as the dependent variable. More specifically, it allows for the first and last brackets
to be open; therefore, the first bracket has no minimum value and the last bracket has no maximum value.
The interval regression is run on the log of the discount rates with domain as an explanatory dummy variable,
which takes the value of 1 for discounting in the environmental domain and 0 otherwise. The latter model
confirms the aforementioned main result.
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Table 9: χ2-Test on Domain Differences in Risk Aversion
Alternative hypothesis: MRAT 6= ERAT
p-value
0.001
Notes: We utilize the χ2-test to determine whether subjects’ choices on gambles are the same across the two
domains.
specifications: Model 1 and Model 2. Model 2 builds upon the first model by adding the
gender variable, an interaction variable between gender and domain, a variable on whether
the subject’s parents own their home, a variable on whether the subject belongs in one
of the top four, pro-environmental groups of DEFRA (2008) (i.e. exhibits environmental
awareness), and a variable on whether the subject scored at least 2 questions correctly on
the CRT. Crucially, we find that subjects exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the
environmental domain relative to the monetary domain.14 These findings culminate in our
second main result.
RESULT 2: Subjects’ risk aversion is statistically different across the monetary and the
environmental domains. Specifically, subjects exhibit higher levels of risk aversion in the
environmental domain.
Support. The results of the χ2-test and the ordered probit regressions indicate significant
differences in subjects’ risk aversion across the two domains.
In Model 2, we observe that the domain and gender regressors are both significant, while
the interaction regressor (domain × gender) is not. This implies that both men and women
exhibit higher levels of risk aversion in the environmental domain than in the monetary one,
and that women exhibit higher levels of risk aversion than men in both the monetary and
the environmental domains. The finding that women are more risk averse than men in the
monetary domain corroborates existing results due to Eckel and Grossman (2002). Crucially,
we show this finding to, also, hold in the environmental domain.
14A negative coefficient indicates an increase in the likelihood that a subject will choose one of the earlier
(safer) gambles, thereby displaying a higher degree of risk aversion.
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Table 10: Ordered Probit Results for Domain Differences in Risk Aversion
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Domain -0.296*** -0.302*
(0.110) (0.166)
Gender -0.615***
(0.214)
Domain × Gender 0.098
(0.242)
Own home -0.178
(0.255)
Environmental awareness -0.032
(0.192)
High CRT -0.112
(0.192)
Order 1 -0.129 -0.066
(0.243) (0.293)
Order 2 -0.348 -0.358
(0.214) (0.231)
Order 3 0.022 -0.035
(0.252) (0.256)
Notes: A subject’s choice is the categorical dependent variable. The two models vary in the number of
explanatory variables included. ‘Domain’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 in the environmental domain
and 0 in the monetary domain, ‘Gender’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject is female and
0 otherwise, ‘Domain × Gender’ is an interaction variable for the previous two dummies, ‘Own home’ is a
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject’s parents own their home and 0 otherwise, ‘Environmental
awareness’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject belongs in one of the top four, pro-environmental
groups of DEFRA (2008) and 0 otherwise, and ‘High CRT’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject
scored at least 2 questions correctly on the CRT and 0 otherwise. The three ‘Order’ variables are dummies
that account for the four possible orders that the tasks could have been undertaken. All standard errors are
reported in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the
1% level.
4.4 Cognitive Ability & Environmental Awareness
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) and the questionnaire enabled us to obtain both a
measure of subjects’ cognitive ability as well as insights to subjects’ environmental awareness,
which could possibly relate to the way different domains were evaluated by subjects. Recall
that a subject exhibits environmental awareness if he/she has been classified in one of the top
four, pro-environmental groups in Panel B of Table 6. We investigate next whether subjects’
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cognitive ability and environmental awareness correlate with individual time preferences and
risk aversion in the two domains. We find that neither time preferences nor risk aversion is
correlated with CRT or environmental awareness across the two domains.15
We apply next a multinomial probit regression on the distinct discounting patterns iden-
tified in Subsection 4.1.1 in order to identify any variable(s) that might correlate with a
subject’s discounting pattern. Our findings are displayed in Table 11. As a base, we used
the subjects that exhibited a constant discounting behavior across the two domains. We
find that parental ownership of the home is a significant factor, which correlates negatively
with both subjects exhibiting a higher discounting in the environmental domain and those
exhibiting a lower discounting in the environmental domain. Consequently, subjects hav-
ing parents that owned their own home correlates positively with subjects that exhibit a
constant discounting pattern across the two domains. In addition, we find a significant cor-
relation between subjects exhibiting environmental awareness and lower discounting in the
environmental domain relative to the monetary domain.
5 Concluding Remarks
We study experimentally subjects’ time preferences and risk aversion across two domains:
the monetary domain and the environmental domain. Our study is the first to utilize an in-
centivized experimental design: in the monetary domain, time preferences and risk aversion
are elicited with real monetary payoffs, whereas in the environmental domain, time pref-
erences and risk aversion are elicited using real, bee-friendly plants. Contrasting subjects’
intertemporal choices across the monetary and environmental domains, we find that subjects’
discounting behavior is not statistically different (RESULT 1). In sharp contrast, subjects’
risk aversion is significantly different across the monetary domain and the environmental
domain; specifically, subjects tend to be unwilling to take on large gambles when it comes
to bee-friendly plants (RESULT 2). This result is not gender-specific; that is, both men and
women exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain relative to the
monetary domain. Finally, we find that women are more risk averse than men in both the
monetary and the environmental domains.
Ideally, these results would have to be evaluated across two important dimensions. First,
time preferences and risk aversion in the environmental domain should be tested with other
15This is a departure from the findings of Frederick (2005). We conjecture that differences in the experi-
mental design (Frederick’s design was not incentivized) can account for the divergence.
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Table 11: Determinants of Discounting Pattern
Variables Higher environmental Lower environmental
discounting discounting
Age 0.212 0.289
(0.175) (0.185)
Gender 0.517 0.758
(0.548) (0.580)
Expenditure 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Own home -2.015** -2.358**
(0.789) (0.962)
Environmental awareness 0.695 1.390**
(0.552) (0.675)
High CRT 0.033 -0.320
(0.258) (0.275)
Constant -6.930* -8.483**
(3.321) (3.556)
Notes: We report the coefficients from the multinomial probit regression conducted. As a base, we used
the subjects that exhibited a constant discounting behavior across the two domains. The variable ‘Age’
corresponds to the age of the participant, the variable ‘Gender’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
subject is female and 0 otherwise, the variable ‘Expenditure’ is a self-reported assessment of the money the
subject spends each month on expenses other than accommodation, the variable ‘Own home’ is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if the subject’s parents own their home and 0 otherwise, ‘Environmental awareness’
is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the subject belongs in one of the top four, pro-environmental groups
of DEFRA (2008) and 0 otherwise, and the variable ‘High CRT’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the
subject scored at least 2 questions correctly on the CRT and 0 otherwise. All standard errors are reported
in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level
environmental instruments and compared to time preferences and risk aversion in the mon-
etary domain to determine the robustness of the aforementioned findings. For instance,
it would be interesting to include instruments that are closer to resembling private goods,
such as energy-saving light bulbs or even instruments that confer little private benefit to the
recipient, such as supporting endangered species. Second, time preferences and risk aver-
sion should be tested across a much broader array of domains to identify domain-specificity
where such exists. The current research highlights that a direct mapping of results from the
monetary domain to the environmental domain is risky. We believe the same holds true for
other domains.
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